teaching and research staff, visiting professors, graduate students, visiting fellows, and invited participants in seminars, workshops, and conferences. As usual, authors bear full responsibility for the content of their contributions. 
Introduction
Early studies of forming democratic citizenship have focussed on the progressive inclusion of increasingly large segments of the population in the electorate, what classical sociologists and political scientists called -incorporation‖ or -participation‖. 1 With the full enfranchisement of the adult population and with the consolidation of national membership boundaries of political systems the analytical focus shifted toward Rokkan's third threshold of democratisation, that is, -representation‖. Since then, citizen-representative congruence has been at the heart of the empirical study of the quality of democratic representation, that is the degree to which voters' preferences are reflected among representatives. 2 While early studies focused on measures of proportionality, in the last years empirical research has addressed the correspondence between ideological preferences at the electorate level and at the policy-makers level. In this regard, the literature has greatly improved the way in which the congruence between citizens and representatives is measured.
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Yet, the analysis of congruence in representation has been conducted under the assumption that electorates by and large reflect citizens. This assumption could be safely made under circumstances of consolidated national boundaries of political systems. The equation between citizenship and electorate is however increasingly problematic in a globalising society with increasing geographical mobility. The definition of citizenship merely through political rights (the right to vote) is restrictive and does not take into account other elements of citizenship such as social rights (Marshall, 1963) and nationality (Brubaker, 1992) .
According to a more encompassing view, the electorate is only a subgroup within the citizenry. The assumption of correspondence between citizens and voters -which probably has never been entirely realistic -does certainly not apply to periods of elevated international mobility with life-long immigrants and emigrants transcending generations. The definition of citizenship and electorate under processes of supra-national integration and globalisation is today subject to -restructuring‖ of boundaries very similar to that of other aspects of social and political life. 4 Under these conditions, the phrase -no taxation without representation‖ acquires new scope.
An increasing share of citizens living and working outside their countries lose political rights leading to a shift between citizenship and electorate. The claim this paper makes is that the measurement of citizen-representative congruence cannot be equated with voterrepresentative congruence and that therefore issues of inclusion should be revisited. By 1 Rokkan speaks of incorporation in his model of democratisation based on four thresholds (Rokkan, 1999) . Dahl presents a similar model of the first wave of democratisation along the two dimensions of liberalisation and participation (Dahl, 1970) . On these processes see also Bendix (1977) . 2 Accountability has been understood as the other main dimension of democratic representation (see, for example, Mansbridge, 2003 ; see also Powell, 2000) . 3 See Huber and Powell (1994) , Powell (2000) , Powell and Vanberg (2000) , Blais and Bodet (2006) , Golder and Stramski (2010) . 4 For the most systematic treatment of the restructuring of the boundaries of political systems under pressure of supra-national integration see Bartolini (2005) .
focussing on the quality of representation of electorates through representatives, the literature has forgotten issues of inclusiveness. It is this gap that the paper aims to fill. By claiming that this discrepancy has a deep impact on the quality of representation, we believe our argument has important implications for future studies on representation. It proposes that representation studies should clarify their understanding of citizenship and operationalise it accordingly, calling for measures of representation against different definitions of citizenship.
It thus proposes to focus on the under-representation of entire social groups rather than on the distribution of voters' preferences. In other words, we wish to shift the focus from representation to inclusion.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we elaborate on the notion of citizenship in relation to the electorate and representation. Second, we present a typology of electorates and the potential causes of variations among types. We show that ideal-typically the right to vote can be granted to (1) nationals (including expatriates), (2) residents (including non-nationals), or a combination of both, i.e. (3) resident nationals only or (4) all residents and nationals. Third, we show qualitatively variance in voting rights for non-national residents and national expatriates across 22 countries and, quantitatively, the discrepancy between citizenship and electorates in these countries. The conclusion discusses normatively the relationship between national and political community, and makes a proposal to overcome the shift between citizenship and political rights. In Marshall's (1963) classical formulation citizenship includes civic, political and social rights. 5 Nationality has been the most important institution for the provision of citizenship rights. 6 The reception of citizenship rights is, however, only partly dependent on nationality.
II. Citizenship, Electorates and Representation
In particular, civic rights are not bounded to nationality as they have developed towards human rights, which are increasingly granted on a global scale. Above all, social rights only partly depend on nationality as non-national residents in most Western countries get similar social provisions as national residents. The status of non-national residents, which have social but not political rights, has been described as -denizenship‖ (Hammar, 1990) . The concept of citizenship is therefore more encompassing than any operationalisation based on political rights. Political rights that define the electorate include, depending on the countries, a more or less wide proportion of citizens -as broadly defined above as the potential recipients of social rights either based on nationality or residency. There is therefore a varying discrepancy (across countries) between electorate and citizenship with some countries achieving a more or less complete coverage of the citizenship and some countries excluding a more or less large group. 5 The nation-state has been, and largely continues to be, the locus of political and social rights. This applies to a lesser extent to civic rights, which have an application across national borders independent of nationality. This is the reason why -as reiterated further down -we focus on the national level as opposed to the local or supranational ones. 6 It has been granted on two principles: ethnicity and residency (Brubaker, 1992) . Which principle is dominant depends on conceptions of nationhood (see also Koopmans et al., 2005) . While civic conceptions of nationhood foster legal citizenship laws that give nationality dependent on residence (jus soli), nationality is according to an ethnic conception of nationhood provided dependent on descent (jus sanguinis) (see also Weil, 1984) .
The distinction between citizenship and voting rights had little impact on votersrepresentatives congruence during the peak of the nationalised state. This is because of the strong coincidence of the territorial boundaries (residency) and membership boundaries (nationality) during the peak of nationalisation. The closure of political, cultural, social, and to some degree economic boundaries along the unitary state (Rokkan, 1999; Caramani, 2004) and the following cultural homogenisation (Gellner, 1983) has created a far-reaching congruence of rights and duties along the lines of the -nation-state‖. Only recent trends of globalisation and European integration have resulted in a decoupling of boundaries along different functional and territorial dimensions. The decoupling of territorial from national boundaries has important consequences. The increase of migration within and between the developed and developing world has had the effect on a growing non-national resident population and on the size of the expatriate community, as well as on the size of the national community through increasing naturalisation rates.
The decoupling also affects the composition of electorates. This is because electoral rights are usually connected to nationality, residency or both. Having the right to vote does not entirely depend on being a national, as in some countries it (also) depends on residence:
whether or not expatriates should have the right to vote, and whether or not non-national residents (immigrants) should be allowed to vote. In the age of globalisation and technological progress the potential impact of the expatriates' votes has become considerable with elections being potentially decided -from abroad‖. Globalisation increases mobility, which affects the size of the expatriate community and strengthens the transnational bonds. Technological innovation has, among others, the effect that voting from abroad has become much easier. With electronic voting, space ceases being a decisive factor for the possibility to vote. As will be shown in the next section, electoral rights for expatriates vary considerably across countries and have a strong (potential) impact on the size and shape of the electorate.
Electoral laws also vary concerning the resident population. Increasingly, countries differ in whether they grant voting rights to non-national residents. Although a trend towards electoral rights for non-national residents can so far mainly be observed at the local level, a few countries granted the right to vote in national elections to all residents. 7 The effect the expansion of the electoral right to non-nationals has on the shape and size of the electorate depends on the size of the foreign community in a given country. The impact of the electoral rights to non-national residents on the variance in the electorates across countries depends on the migration flows and on naturalisation laws. All this increases the discrepancy between electorate and citizenship, as well as the extent to which this discrepancy varies across countries. According to our definition of citizenship it leads to newly disenfranchised groups, namely expatriates and immigrants. Examples of citizens who lost the right to vote back Germany), with some cases of explicit discouragement from both the sending and the receiving country. 8 We do not make the claim that inclusiveness necessarily affects the voter-representative
relationship. The quality of representation is in principle independent from levels of inclusiveness. 9 However, if the preferences of the emigrants and immigrants systematically differ from the national resident ones, whether these groups keep or receive the right to vote (through naturalisation or the electoral law) matters for the citizen-representative congruence. The claim this paper makes is that the analysis of the quality of representation can no longer afford to use the shortcut of equating citizenship with the electorate as increasingly large and permanent segments of the citizenship are excluded (rather than included) from access to political rights. It is this discrepancy between citizenship and electorate -a problem of inclusion rather than representation -that this paper is concerned with. 8 We deliberately renounce to discuss the exclusion of other social groups such as minors, prisoners and mentally ill persons for which provisions also widely vary across countries. 9 In theory, one can achieve perfect representation also when no citizen has the right vote.
III. A Typology of Electorates

III.1. Four Types of Electorates
In developed democracies the shape of the electorate can ideal-typically be summarised in four different types depending on whether or not the electoral right is given to non-national residents and/or expatriates. Similar to Bauböck (2005: 685) , who distinguishes between four perspectives on -expansive electoral rights‖, we distinguish four types of electorates: 
12
 The national and resident electorate includes all nationals (whether or not they live in the home country) as well as all residents (nationals and foreigners). These are the most inclusive electoral rules extending political rights not only to expatriates but also to non-national residents. Both membership and territory principles apply. The closest example of this type is Britain but, strictly speaking, there are no empirical cases.
13
10 For all these examples qualifications are in order. In Canada, for example, expatriates have the right to vote from abroad during the first five years after emigration. 11 Italy only recently introduced provisions for voting from abroad linked to registration in a consulate. Before, expatriates had to travel back to Italy to make use of their right to vote. 12 This is due to the very short period of time during which expatriates keep the right to vote from abroad (three years). The minimum requirement for qualifying to vote for residents is one year for non-nationals. 13 British nationals living abroad can vote as long as the first 15 years after expatriation. Furthermore, the category of -residents‖ is very expansive as it includes all resident Commonwealth nationals (as well as Irish nationals).
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These types of electorates are listed from the most restrictive to the most extensive. The two principles that apply are the membership and the territorial one. Their combination can be depicted as in Figure 1 . Two types are pure in the sense that they are based on either territorial or membership principles, whereas two are mixed in the sense that they combine both principles. Below we will show the degree to which developed democracies fit into these ideal-types and, consequently, the degree to which they differ. We do not rely only on the qualitative description of the rules, but also present quantitative data on the actual shape and size of the electorates. For the moment being, we concentrate on types and sources of variation between countries. 
III.2. Sources of Cross-Country Variation
Electorates across countries vary because of differing provisions in two types of laws: first, the nationality law and, second, the electoral law. In addition, electorates vary because of differences in immigration and emigration rates.
1. Nationality laws are relevant for variations in electorates, and in the degree of discrepancy between citizenship and electorate, as nationality automatically gives access to political rights. Nationality laws affect membership. First, nationality laws determine the size of expatriate electorate (emigration) in that it rules on the maintenance of nationality after leaving the country (especially for further generations). Second, nationality (here, strictly speaking, naturalisation laws) determines the size of non-national resident communities (immigrants) in that it rules on the access to nationality for resident immigrants (again also for further generations). Nationality laws affect the extent to which more or less large immigrant/emigrant groups get (or keep) nationality and consequently political rights.
2. Electoral laws are relevant for variation in electorates, and in the degree of discrepancy between citizenship and electorate, as they grant the right to vote. Electoral laws affect territoriality. First, electoral laws rule on the right to vote within the country for non-nationals.
It is through the electoral law that political rights are given to residents who are not nationals (immigrants). Second, electoral laws rule on the right to vote outside the country for nationals. It is through the electoral law that political rights are given to nationals who are not resident (emigrants). Electoral laws affect the extent to which more or less large immigrant/emigrant groups get (or keep) political rights (independently of nationality).
The interaction between migration rates and the two types of law is crucial, as the data in
the quantitative part of the paper (next section) show. Figure 2 summarises the discussion.
What appears to be crucial is the interaction between rates of immigration/emigration (and therefore the size of non-national resident groups and expatriates) on the one hand, and the legal framework which makes it possible to access the right to vote. As mentioned, there are two possibilities for getting the right to vote: nationality and electoral law.
The groups of non-national residents and expatriates can be either small or large (we simplify for the sake of the argument). We ignore the possibility in which they are small as this does not affect the level of discrepancy between citizenship and electorate. If there are only very little numbers of immigrants and emigrants, citizenship and electorate correspond.
They also correspond if immigrants are given the nationality since citizens acquire automatically the right to vote. Also when emigrants lose the nationality (and therefore claims to social rights) the two correspond. 14 The interesting cases in the perspective of this paper are those in which one finds large numbers of either immigrants or emigrants or both. In this case we do not have a citizenship corresponding to the electorate as many nationals may not have the right to vote (because they live abroad) and many non-nationals living in the country may not have the right to vote. If there are large numbers of emigrants and/or immigrants, citizenship and electorate do not correspond unless the legal framework corrects for it (either through the nationality law or the electoral law). 15 The last column of the table shows how the combination of legal provisions for the right to vote of emigrants and immigrants combine to determine the four types of electorates.
14 Note that losing the nationality does not only depend on the country of origin but also on the host country which may require emigrants to give up their nationality of origin. 15 The figure simplifies a much more complicated story in which access to political rights for nationals living abroad is made difficult by registration requirements. This is discussed and illustrated below in the quantitative part of the analysis. 
IV. Discrepant Electorates in 22 OECD Countries
We divide the empirical analysis in two parts. First, qualitatively, we carry out the analysis of nationality laws and electoral laws, and how they empirically vary across countries. Second, quantitatively, we propose an analysis of the discrepancy between citizenship and electorate based on the size of expatriate and non-national resident groups.
IV.1. Qualitative Analysis: Naturalisation Laws and Electoral Laws
As we have seen above, it is possible to acquire voting rights either through nationality laws or through electoral laws. The first includes individuals in the membership of nationals, or excludes them. The second includes individuals resident in a territory (non-national citizens) and those resident abroad, or excludes them. What appears from the comparative information collected for 22 OECD countries presented in Table 1 Australia for six). Portugal allows emigrants to vote in national elections for up to ten years after expatriation. The impact of this variation on the discrepancy between citizenship and electorate obviously depends on the size of both immigration and emigration. We will deal with the interaction between laws and rates of migrations in the quantitative analysis. 16 The exception being diplomats and military. 
1)
In most countries, expatriates usually need to register as voters (Green, 2007) .
2)
Only diplomats and military.
3)
Not more than 15 years in the EU or a Portuguese speaking country. Additionally, they have to stay at least 30 days in Portugal in the last five years, and speak Portuguese (Costa Lobo, 2007: 84) .
4)
In the case of Ireland British residents are also allowed to vote for Dáil elections. In Portugal, Brazilian citizens with special rights acquire voting rights, and in the United Kingdom, these rights include Commonwealth and Irish citizens. N.a. Information not available.
Sources:
Data on expatriate voting rights from IDEA (2007); electoral rights for immigrants and access to nationality from Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007); data on foreign born population from OECD (2006).
Contrary to electoral laws, nationality laws vary a great deal across countries in the extent to which they give access to nationality and, consequently, voting rights. Nationality laws are the set of rules through which the conditions for the gain or loss of nationality are set. For clarity we will speak in general of -nationality law‖ to indicate the extent to which emigrants maintain their nationality of origin, and of -naturalisation law‖ to indicate the extent to which immigrants acquire the new nationality. Most countries do not deprive emigrants of their nationality even after generations -some do for the third generation. Nationality laws therefore do not vary a great deal in regard to national expatriates (emigrants). 17 They do vary, however, a great deal in regard to the naturalisation of non-national resident citizens.
While naturalisation laws based on jus sanguinis are very closed towards ethnically distinct immigrants -and therefore generate large numbers of non-national residents -countries based on jus soli tend to be much more open in the way they naturalise the majority of their immigrant residents. Good examples of -hard-to-get‖ naturalisation are Austria and
Switzerland. The third column in Table 1 , however, points to other countries for which naturalisation for non-national residents is difficult. Using the MIPEX index that operationalise the easiness with which single nationalities can be acquired, we see that besides Austria and Switzerland, also Germany, Denmark and Finland (as well as Italy and Spain) have naturalisation laws unfavourable to the incorporation of non-nationals in the electorate through the nationality law.
The discussion so far leads us to conclude that electoral laws vary little with the exception of Ireland (as far as the electoral law on emigrants is concerned) and New Zealand (as far as the electoral law concerning immigrants is concerned). In regard to the acquisition of nationality and therefore the automatic access to political rights, again we find little variation concerning nationality law (emigrants). However, there is a large variation in naturalisation laws (immigrants). This information leads us to formulate the hypothesis that differences in the levels of discrepancy (between citizenship and electorates) are primarily caused by variations in naturalisation laws, and amplified by a large influx of immigrants.
IV.2. Quantitative Analysis: Size of Emigration and Immigration
In this section we proceed in three steps. First, we describe citizenship in 21 countries.
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Then, we describe electorates. Finally, we describe the discrepancy between citizenship and electorate and interpret variations in the levels of discrepancy with reference to (1) nationality and electoral laws (mentioned above) and (2) rates of immigration and emigration. 17 Regulations regarding the maintenance of nationality for expatriates is made more complicated by conditions set by the receiving country and the possibility to have a double nationality. A good example is the impact on the German naturalisation law on the propensity of Turkish immigrants to resign from their former nationality before the change of the German naturalization law in 2002. 18 We must unfortunately exclude New Zealand from this part of the analysis because of unreliable information.
The data on which we can draw are official register data from national statistical offices and from the OECD. Census data contain the number of residents and the number of nonnational residents by age cohorts. The size of the electorates has been derived from data on electoral results. The data on expatriate communities had, in several cases, to be estimated.
The most valid (and in many cases only) estimates on the size of the expatriate community have been calculated by the OECD for the year 2000 (2001 for Italy). They only include the number of expatriates in other OECD countries and should therefore be interpreted as the lower bound of the real number. The data further estimate the number of expatriates at the age of 15 or older and do therefore slightly overestimate the share of expatriates at voting age. 
Notes:
Countries are ordered by size of resident nationals. Citizenship is defined as the sum of all nationals (in country and abroad) and all residents in the country (whether nationals or not). All figures exclude youngsters below 18 years of age. The interpretation of such figures must allow for bias caused by prisoners and mentally ill persons who, in some countries, are excluded from voting rights. New Zealand is excluded because of unreliable information.
Sources:
National statistical offices; Dumont and Lemaître (2005) . Because in the case of the Czech Republic and Spain the estimates have been unrealistically low, the share of expatriates is estimated as the deviation of the electorate from the national residents. 
Notes:
Countries are ordered by level of discrepancy as a percentage of citizenship. New Zealand is excluded because of missing information. Sources: National statistical offices; Dumont and Lemaître (2005) .
In Table 3 This is one out of five citizens. As for Luxembourg, disenfranchised citizens are mostly (above 80% for both Austria and Switzerland) non-national residents.
19 Additional similar cases are Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Italy. For these countries we see a lower level of discrepancy, that is, exclusion. However, the composition of the excluded citizens is very similar to that of Luxembourg, Switzerland and Austria, with more than 65% of the excluded citizens being immigrants.
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Things look differently for Portugal and Ireland, as well as for Denmark, the Netherlands and Japan. Portugal does not have a very high rate of discrepancy (6.6%). It is only slightly higher for Denmark and the Netherlands (about 8%) while for Japan it is 3.8%. On the contrary, the rate is quite high for Ireland (14.6%). What these five cases have in common is that the proportion of citizens without voting rights are to a large extent national expatriates who lost the right to vote. The proportion of expatriates among the disenfranchised citizens is around 75% for Ireland, 60% for Portugal, and around 50% for Denmark and the Netherlands. Another country for which the proportion is high is Japan: above 70% of the discrepancy (which, however, is a small one) is due to national expatriates. This is explained by the very low immigration rates in Japan.
21 19 The same is true for Spain and the Czech Republic. Because in these cases the OECD estimates of the expatriate community have been unrealistically low, it has been estimated as the deviation of the electorate from the national residents. In reality, however, the share of expatriates without the right to vote is still somewhat higher implying that slightly less than 100% of the disenfranchised are immigrants. 20 Incomplete data sources do not allow us to comment on Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 21 Other countries with a quite large segment of expatriates among the excluded citizens are Iceland, Italy, Finland and the United Kingdom. The proportion of emigrants in the segment of citizenship without voting rights is above 30% for all these countries. In these cases we see very clearly the interaction at play between immigration flows and nationality (or naturalisation) laws. The largest discrepancies between citizenship and electorate exist in those cases in which large rates of immigration are combined with restrictive nationality laws. As seen above, this is the factor that really varies across countries. Whereas electoral laws hardly ever allow non-national residents to vote, naturalisation may or may not give access to voting rights. It is therefore the interaction between high rates of immigration and restrictive naturalisation laws that explain most of the cross-country variation of discrepancy between electorate and citizenship. The same cannot be said to the same extent for national expatriates. Here rates count, too, but as we have seen the variation in electoral laws (granting voting rights to emigrants) is small.
V. Conclusion
This paper has shown that the quality of representation does not only depend on the degree to which voters' preferences are congruent with those of the representatives, but also on the degree to which citizens are included in the representation circuit. Based on a broad definition of citizenship we have shown that citizen-representative congruence cannot be equated with, and operationalised through, voter-representative congruence. The more or less large discrepancy between citizenship and electorate makes this one-to-one equivalence between citizenship and electorate problematic. The paper therefore questions the -denominator‖, whether using electorates can replace citizenship. Our goal was to shift the discussion back to more fundamental problems of inclusion/exclusion, to which globalisation and the increasing geographical mobility of individuals gives new scope.
Empirical results of the paper show that the main source of discrepancy between citizenship and electorate is the combination of high rates of non-national residents (immigrants) in countries in which naturalisation laws make it difficult to access nationality and thus voting rights. This large discrepancy is also not solved by electoral laws since these do usually not grant voting rights to non-nationals. Problems of representation are therefore strictly linked to conceptions of nationality -who is a member of the national community and who is notand to conceptions of citizenship -who is a member of the political community and who is not. In principle, it would be possible to imagine changes in electoral laws granting voting rights to citizens without making them nationals. This would make it possible to include citizens in the political community without including them in the national community. It is an instrument that would solve normative conflicts about confusing definitions of who is a national and who is not. It would also solve problems of temporality, since electoral laws could make voting rights for non-nationals dependent upon residency. Non-national citizens vote as long as they live and pay taxes in a country, and lose the right as soon as they leave it. This paper, thus also points to normative implications for future research and policy making.
